Multiple bank lending induces borrowers to take too much debt when creditor rights are poorly protected; moreover, banks wish to engage in opportunistic lending at their competitors'expenses if borrowers'collateral is su¢ ciently risky. These incentives lead to credit rationing and non-competitive interest rates, possibly exceeding the monopoly level. If banks share information about past debts and seniority via credit reporting systems, the incentive to overborrow is mitigated: interest and default rates decrease; credit access improves if the value of collateral is not very volatile, but worsens otherwise. Recent empirical studies report evidence consistent with these predictions. The paper also shows that private and social incentives to share information are not necessarily aligned.
Introduction
In most countries, …rms tend to borrow from several banks: this applies to more than 85 percent of European companies (Ongena and Smith, 2000) , with even small and medium-sized …rms patronizing several lenders (Detragiache, Garella and Guiso, 2000, and Farinha and Santos, 2002) . This pattern is also found in the United States: Petersen and Rajan (1994) document that "borrowing from multiple lenders increases the price and reduces the availability of credit" (p. 3). We argue that actual or potential multiple bank lending can have these adverse e¤ects because it induces both borrowers and lenders to behave opportunistically, whenever the value of collateral is volatile and creditor rights are not well protected.
When people can borrow from several banks and are protected by limited liability, they have the incentive to overborrow: each additional dollar of a borrower's debt raises default probability vis-à-vis all lenders. Moreover, lenders themselves may behave opportunistically, o¤ering extra credit to customers already indebted with competing banks, while protecting their own claims via high interest rates. And customers may wish to avail themselves of this extra credit to undertake larger and less e¢ cient projects that generate private bene…ts for them ("empirebuilding" activities). To protect themselves against the contractual externalities created by such opportunistic behavior, lenders may ration credit and increase interest rates. 1 Our paper brings out the implications of these externalities for credit market equilibrium, and investigates how their intensity is a¤ected by information sharing among lenders (credit reporting), via private credit bureaus or public credit registries. We show that, with no information sharing and poor creditor right protection, banks deny credit to some applicants, and borrowers default strategically when their collateral value is depressed. If the value of collateral is not too volatile, information sharing improves credit market performance: it reduces interest rates and default rates, and it eliminates rationing. But if the value of collateral is very volatile, information sharing induces the credit market to freeze. This is because information sharing has two opposite incentive e¤ects: on one hand, it allows lenders to better protect themselves against borrowers'opportunistic behavior, and therefore to charge lower rates and expand lending; on the other hand, it enables opportunistic lenders to better target those borrowers to whom they can pro…tably lend at their competitors'expenses. When collateral value is not very volatile, the …rst e¤ect prevails; when it is, the second does, because risk shifting becomes more pro…table.
Our model of the credit market is very stylized. A representative entrepreneur can borrow from several banks to carry out either a small investment project or a large but less pro…table one. Yet, he may wish to undertake the large project because he can appropriate some of its revenue as private bene…t, to an extent that depends on the degree of creditor protection.
The entrepreneur's collateral is risky, so that he may default if its value happens to be low.
Lenders cannot observe which project is actually carried out by borrowers, so that they face a common-agency problem. 2 Depending on the severity of this agency problem, three equilibrium outcomes can emerge in the absence of information sharing. First, when creditor rights are well protected, entrepreneurs get loans at the competitive interest rate and undertake the small and e¢ cient project.
Second, at intermediate levels of creditor protection, two types of equilibria exist. One features rationing and strategic default: credit applicants are funded with probability lower than one, but they may succeed in borrowing opportunistically from more than one bank. Interest rates are non-competitive, and new lenders do not enter for fear of lending to overindebted entrepreneurs. The other is an equilibrium where loans are granted at non-competitive rates, all entrepreneurs are served by a single bank, and competitors refrain from undercutting it for fear that the entrepreneur may borrow even further and default. While the latter parallels the equilibrium in Parlour and Rajan (2001) , the rationing equilibrium is novel and inherently related to multi-bank lending. In the non-competitive equilibrium without rationing, instead, credit relationships are exclusive and multi-bank lending only plays a latent role.
Thirdly, if creditor rights are very poorly protected and collateral values are highly volatile, the only surviving equilibria are those with rationing or market freeze. In this region, if the market does not freeze, di¤erent groups of lenders o¤er credit at di¤erent terms, possibly at "usurious rates" that exceed even the monopoly level.
When instead banks share information about their clients'outstanding debts and seniority, 2 Whinston (1986a, 1986b) o¤er the …rst general tratment of this class of models. Kahn and Mookherjee (1998) specialize the analysis to the case of insurance contracts, but consider a model with sequential o¤ers. Segal and Whinston (2003) and Bisin and Guaitoli (2004) consider a more general contracting space by introducing latent contracts and menus. Stole (2003, 2009 ) study common agency models with adverse selection and menus. they can condition their loans on the borrowers'contractual history, and thereby better guard against opportunistic lending. Hence information sharing expands the region where lending can be only o¤ered at competitive rates and e¢ ciency prevails; if entrepreneurs' collateral is not too volatile, information sharing eliminates rationing and lowers interest rates. But beside this "bright side", credit-reporting systems also have a "dark side" that emerges when the value of borrowers'collateral is very volatile. In this case, lenders have a strong incentive to bet on the appreciation of collateral by providing extra loans to low-debt customers of other banks.
Credit-reporting systems may facilitate such opportunistic behavior, allowing lenders to target more easily low-debt customers, and thus further exacerbate rationing.
In most of the paper, banks share information only about entrepreneurs'past indebtedness.
However, we also extend the model to the case where information sharing allows banks to monitor the subsequent indebtedness of their clients. In this instance, the bene…ts of information sharing are ampli…ed, and its "dark side" disappears altogether. 3 Finally, we brie ‡y investigate whether information sharing can be expected to arise spontaneously whenever socially bene…cial, if banks can initially commit to share information with competitors, for instance via a credit bureau. We …nd that in general this outcome is not guaranteed: in the region where information sharing eliminates incentives to opportunitic borrowing, there are both e¢ cient and competitive equilibria where banks choose to share information, and ine¢ cient and non-competitive equilibria where they do not. Which equilibrium is selected depends on how entrepreneurs select the bank they patronize when several banks o¤er the same rates: if borrowers tend to be "loyal" to a speci…c bank, no information is shared in equilibrium. In this case, government intervention to induce lenders to share information is warranted.
In contrast, such intervention is unnecessary where e¢ cient equilibria prevail even without infomation sharing, and detrimental in the region where information sharing generates market freeze. In these two regions, private and social incentives are aligned, because banks do not share information voluntarily.
Taken together, our model produces three main testable implications. First, absent information sharing, rationing can emerge if collateral values are volatile and credit protection is poor; this rationing is associated with high interest and default rates, consistent with evidence from developing countries (Mookherjee et al. 2000) . If the value of collateral is very volatile, some lenders should charge usurious rates and experience very frequent defaults, and credit should be rationed. This is consistent with the panel-data evidence reported by Degryse et al. (2011) , who investigate the externalities between lenders by studying the incumbent lender's response to new loans to its customers provided by competitors: they …nd that the greater the volatility of collateral, the stronger is the incumbent's adverse interest rate and credit tightening response.
This aligns with our prediction that the externality arising from non-exclusive lending only arises when the value of collateral is su¢ ciently volatile.
Second, we show that when banks share information about past debts (not merely about delinquencies), they end up reducing default and interest rates, particularly for borrowers that are informationally opaque and have risky collateral. These predictions square with an expanding body of evidence, based on cross-country aggregate data (Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer, 2007 , Jappelli and Pagano, 2002 , Pagano and Jappelli, 1993 and on microeconomic data (Brown, Jappelli and Pagano, 2009; Galindo and Miller, 2001; Doblas-Madrid and Minetti, 2010, Chen and Degryse, 2009; de Janvry, McIntosh and Sadoulet, 2009 ).
Third, information sharing about past debts is predicted to increase credit access by eliminating rationing, for moderate levels of creditor protection and collateral volatility. But information sharing may exacerbate rationing in situations where creditor rights are poorly protected and collateral values very uncertain, as in some developing countries or more generally at times of great turbulence like …nancial crises, as found by Erzberg, Liberti and Paravisini (2008) in their study of the extension of Argentine credit reporting coverage.
On the whole, our analysis explains why credit bureaus and registries so often pool data about past debts and report clients' total indebtedness to banks, rather than just reporting past delinquencies and borrowers'characteristics. This activity by credit-reporting systems only makes sense in the context of multiple-bank lending. Hence, this paper complements earlier models of information sharing in credit markets, which invariably assume exclusive lending.
These models show that sharing data on defaults and customers'characteristics enables banks to lend more safely, overcoming adverse selection (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993) , or promoting borrowers'e¤ort to repay loans Pagano, 1997 and 2000). 4 Finally, our paper also relates to the vast literature on the determinants of credit rationing (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , Besanko and Thakor (1987) and Bester (1987) , among others), which all share a common feature: rationing arises because the interest rate charged by banks is "too low"to enable the credit market to clear but no bank attempts to raise it, fearing to worsen the pool of loan applicants. In contrast, in our model banks react to the danger of opportunistic lending both by rationing and by raising their rates above the competitive level, in some cases even beyond the monopoly level. Another distinctive feature of the credit rationing due to multibank lending is that it is more likely to arise when collateral value is volatile, which instead is inconsequential in the Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) and in the Holmstrom-Tirole (1997) model. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 analyzes the incentives to overborrowing in the regime with no information sharing. Section 4 and Section 5 respectively characterize equilibria without and with information sharing about borrowers' indebtedness and seniority structure. Section 6.1 studies banks'incentives to share information.
Section 7 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
The model
We consider a set B of banks that compete by o¤ering credit to a representative entrepreneur.
The interest rate at which banks raise funds is standardized to zero. The entrepreneur is riskneutral and can undertake a small project or a large one, requiring an investment x or 2x respectively. The two projects have revenues y S and y L , with y L > y S , so that the net surplus
Due to decreasing returns, the optimal project is the small
Due to limited managerial capacity, each entrepreneur can undertake at most one project.
The entrepreneur has no resources when projects are started, and can apply sequentially for loans at multiple banks. A credit contract c b = (l b ; r b ) issued by bank b 2 B consists of a loan l b and a repayment r b .
The contractual environment is shaped by the following assumptions:
(A1) Hidden action. A bank cannot verify the size of the borrower's project, and thus whether he takes additional lending from other banks. However, any loan that is not invested in a project must be returned to the bank.
(A2) Limited enforcement. The entrepreneur is protected by limited liability and can appropriate a fraction 2 (0; 1] of the revenue of the large project, which cannot be seized by lenders in case of default.
(A3) Uncertain future wealth. The entrepreneur has a stochastic endowment e w that equals either 1 + or 1 with equal probability. We normalize its expected value w to 1 and assume that its standard deviation lies in the interval [0; 1].
(A4) Costly state veri…cation: The realization of future wealth e w is unveri…able except in case of default.
(A5) Liquidation in bankruptcy: We assume that, in case of default, debtors are paid according to their seniority.
(A6) Unviability of the large project: The expected amount that the entrepreneur can pledge upon undertaking the large project does not cover the project's cost:
Assumptions (A1) and (A2), together with multiple-bank lending, create a moral hazard problem: after borrowing an amount x, the entrepreneur may want to borrow an additional x and undertake the large project, so as to appropriate a share of its revenue. This can damage lenders, since the large project yields less than the small one, and its return can be partially appropriated by the entrepreneur. The fact that the entrepreneur can divert resources from the large project, but not from the small one, captures the idea that investment may be driven by an "empire building" motive: entrepreneurs may wish to undertake unpro…table investments if they know that control over a larger company generates more private bene…ts for them, at their creditors'expenses. Assumption (A1) also requires that banks can observe whether credit was actually used for investment (rather than for consumption) and recall any unused line of credit:
this rules out another form of moral hazard, namely the possibility that the entrepreneur spends on consumption funds lent for investment. The idea is that banks can at least verify whether an investment was made, though not its size.
Assumption (A3) captures uncertainty about the future value of the entrepreneur's personal assets (e.g., his house) or about the …rm's pro…ts. This uncertainty is a novel ingredient relative to the relative literature: as we shall see, it creates scope for opportunistic lending that is not present, for instance, in Parlour and Rajan (2001) . Most of our novel results are traceable to this new assumption, which deeply changes the nature of banking competition. Assumption (A4) rules out …nancing contracts contingent on future wealth, and implies pure debt …nancing:
verifying borrowers' wealth is so costly as to be worthwhile only upon default. 5 Assumption (A5) is made for realism, since in the presence of collateral most legal systems allow for seniority rules in case of default; however, our results qualitatively hold also under pro-rata repayment. 6
Finally, assumption (A6) is made to simplify the analysis and focus on the most novel equilibria: if it were relaxed, by assuming that also the large project is viable, there would be an additional parameter region where the entrepreneur undertakes the large project with certainty -a type of ine¢ cient equilibria similar to those already studied by Bizer and DeMarzo (1992) .
It is to be noticed that, even if the large project is not …nancially viable, the entrepreneur may still want to carry it out solely to extract private bene…ts at the expense of (some) lenders.
Hence, banks must worry that their loan o¤ers might lead to opportunistic behavior, as we shall see below.
Information-sharing regimes
We will study two alternative regimes of communication between banks:
under no information sharing, banks can verify neither borrowers'total indebtedness nor the seniority structure of their debt;
under information sharing, banks can verify borrowers'indebtedness, that is, their total pledged repayment, its breakdown among creditors and their seniority. 7
This captures a common feature of credit reporting systems, which allow lenders to interrogate credit bureaus or registers about the exposure of prospective clients upon receiving a loan application.
The game
We represent market interactions as a game in which the entrepreneur visits banks and applies for credit sequentially, as illustrated in Figure 7 . Each bank b can o¤er a loan contract
The uncertainty about the entrepreneur's endowment is resolved at the …nal contracting stage . Because of free entry, no bank can be sure that its customer will not get additional loans in the future: to capture this idea, we assume that there is no last contracting stage, a common assumption in the literature on sequential contracting in banking and insurance (Bizer and DeMarzo (1992) and Khan and Mookherjee (1998) ). Speci…cally, contracting between 0 and features an in…nite number of stages in which banks post loan o¤ers, the entrepreneur applies for credit and banks decide whether to grant it. All the results of the model continue to hold with a …nite number of banks, if these can make o¤ers at di¤erent stages and there is no last stage, in the sense that each bank can o¤er credit repeatedly. But this assumption would only make banks'strategies more complex to describe.
To guarantee e¤ective competition between lenders, the entrepreneur can apply for as many loans as he wishes and eventually accept only the cheapest ones. In other words, he can always opt out of a contract signed at stage by returning the corresponding loan to the lender at no cost before the investment stage + 1. In the investment stage at + 1 the entrepreneur decides which investment project to undertake, if any. If the loans granted by banks exceed the desired scale of investment, the excess credit is returned to the respective lenders. 8
[Insert Figure 1 ]
The return on the investment project chosen and the …nal value of wealth e w are realized at the …nal stage + 2, where loans are repaid in full or the borrower defaults.
At every stage < , the bank moving at that stage posts a contract c , 9 the entrepreneur can apply for this contract, and the bank accepts his application with probability 2 [0; 1].
This probability can be reinterpreted as the fraction of credit applicants who receive credit, if the assumption of a single representative entrepreneur is replaced with that of a continuum of identical entrepreneurs.
Histories and strategies
The history known to the bank o¤ering credit at stage depends on the information sharing regime: without information sharing, each bank knows the applications received, its own acceptance decisions and the contracts previously o¤ered by banks; in contrast, with information sharing, a bank also knows the entrepreneur's past indebtedness, that is, both his total pledged repayment and its breakdown across loans. The history known to the entrepreneur consists of his sequence of applications and the acceptance decisions by the corresponding banks.
Bank 's strategy is a contract o¤er c = (l ; r ) and an acceptance probability conditional on the history observed by the bank up to . The entrepreneur's strategy is a sequence of historycontingent applications and a choice of the project size n 2 fS; Lg.
Payo¤s
The players' payo¤s depend on the loan contracts agreed up to the last contracting stage and the choice of the project size. In particular, the entrepreneur's payo¤ depends on his …nal indebtedness R arising from the sequence of loan contracts agreed upon, i.e., the total repayment pledged to all the banks with whom he signed contracts:
wherer = r denotes the repayment pledged on a loan agreed at stage (and not returned before the investment stage). Hencer = 0 if the entrepreneur has either not signed any contract at stage or has signed it but returned the corresponding loan before the investment stage. 9 The case in which a bank does not post any o¤er is captured by the convention that it o¤ers the null contract c ; (l ; = 0; r ; = 0).
Entrepreneurs Thus the …nal payo¤ accruing to the entrepreneur with project n 2 fS; Lg and wealth e w, upon agreeing to repay R , is u n ( e w; R ) n y n + max 0; (1 n )y n + e w R ;
where by assumption S = 0 and L = , because the entrepreneur can extract private bene…ts only from the large project. The second term in the previous expression captures the fact that, in case of default, the entrepreneur is protected by limited liability, and that default occurs if the realized value of pledgeable wealth falls short of the total pledged repayment, i.e.,
(1 n )y n + e w < R . Recalling that the two realizations of e w are equally likely and that E( e w) = 1, the expected utility of the entrepreneur can be written as
If the entrepreneur borrows x only from bank 1, this expression equals E e w [u S ( e w; r 1 )] = 1 2 max f0; y S + 1 r 1 g + 1 2 max f0; y S + 1 + r 1 g :
If the repayment owed to the bank is less than the project's revenue (r 1 y S ), there is no default and the entrepreneur's payo¤ becomes y S + 1 r 1 .If instead the entrepreneur borrows x from both bank 1 and bank 2 and undertakes the large project, his expected utility is
Banks The pro…t that bank b expects from lending to the entrepreneur if he undertakes a project of size n 2 fS; Lg is:
where r n b ( e w) represents the entrepreneur's actual repayment as a function of the realization e w of his wealth. If the entrepreneur has enough wealth to repay the loan, he will repay the interest rate r b pledged to bank b; instead, in case of default his pledgeable wealth is allotted to banks according to their seniority, so that the junior bank will get the debtor's pledgeable wealth minus the repayments to senior creditors, R b = P <b r , if positive. Hence, the actual repayment to bank b is
;
For instance, if there are only two active lenders, bank 1 and bank 2, and the repayment due to bank 1 (the senior one) is r 1 y S , then R 1 = 0 and R 2 = r 1 . Hence, if the entrepreneur chooses the large project (n = L), then the actual repayment to the junior bank in state e w is r L 2 ( e w; r 1 ) = 8 > < > :
where the …rst line corresponds to the case of no default, and the second to default.
Equilibrium
Since with no information sharing each bank does not observe the actions previously taken by its current loan applicants, the game is one of imperfect information, so that the solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). Instead, when banks share information, the game is one of perfect information and therefore we look for Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE), because in this regime banks know all relevant information about the past.
In the equilibrium analysis developed in the following sections we adopt the following tiebreaking condition: in any PBE a bank prefers to lend whenever it is indi¤erent between lending via a jointly incentive compatible contract and not lending. This assumption rules out uninteresting equilibria in which banks earn pro…ts by lending at non-competitive rates and their competitors do not undercut them in the belief that their o¤ers would themselves be subsequently undercut.
In characterizing the equilibrium, with no loss of generality we shall consider only equilibria where the entrepreneur borrows either x or 2x, and signs contracts with at most two banks: by assumption (A1), if the entrepreneur were to borrow any di¤erent amount, he would have to return any credit not used for investment to the corresponding bank.
Overborrowing incentives without information sharing
In our setting, multiple lending creates the potential for ine¢ ciency, which in our setting arises when the entrepreneur overborrows so as to undertake the large project. Exclusive lending would rule out this outcome, since each bank could costlessly prevent the entrepreneur from borrowing from other lenders and undertake the large project. But in our model exclusivity is not enforceable: once a borrower has received a loan to fund the small project, he may borrow more and switch to the large one, so as to appropriate a fraction of its revenue.
For any contract c 1 = (x; r 1 ) o¤ered by the senior bank (bank 1 hereafter), this opportunistic behavior surely occurs under two conditions. First, the junior bank has the incentive to provide additional funding, because this yields a non-negative pro…t:
where r L 2 ( e w) is de…ned by expression (5). Second, the entrepreneur has the incentive to seek additional funds, because the large project yields greater expected utility than the small one:
where u L ( e w; r 1 ; r 2 ) and u S ( e w; r 1 ) are de…ned by expressions (2) and (1), and r 1 and r 2 are the repayments pledged to the senior and the junior bank, respectively.
If condition (7) were not to hold for any repayment r 2 x, overborrowing would never occur, because the entrepreneur would have no incentive to undertake the large project. In this case, moral hazard is no concern for lenders, who therefore can compete as under exclusivity.
Conversely, when both inequalities (6) and (7) simultaneously hold for any contract c 1 = (x; r 1 ),
with r 1 2 [x; y S ] o¤ered by the senior bank, then overborrowing will necessarily occur. In this section, we analyze incentives to overborrow by referring these two polar cases. Building on his preliminary analysis, in the next section we shall chacterize the equilibria that arise when there is scope for overborrowing.
E¢ cient benchmark
E¢ ciency is guaranteed if, when banks require the lowest possible repayment x, the entrepreneur wants to undertake the small (and e¢ cient) project, i.e. inequality (6) is reversed for r 1 = r 2 = x:
Simple computations show that this e¢ ciency condition can be rewritten as
When this inequality holds, banks can lend x without fearing borrowers' opportunism, and therefore will undercut each other, pushing the equilibrium repayment down to the competitive level. Hence: 10
Proposition 1 In the parameter region where
there is only a competitive equilibrium where the entrepreneur undertakes the small project and pledges a total repayment x. This region is not empty and its area is increasing in v and decreasing in .
The region de…ned in this proposition corresponds to area A in Figure 7 , where the private bene…t from the large project is measured on the vertical axis and the volatility of collateral value on the horizontal axis. Its boundary ( ) is decreasing in : when the entrepreneur's wealth is riskier, overborrowing gives him a larger gain in the good state, while he is protected by limited liability in the bad state. This incentive to overborrow must be o¤set by a stronger 1 0 Even though for simplicity we prove the following proposition with reference to the case where each entrepreneur borrows x from one bank, in this region competitive equilibrium is perfectly compatible with multiple bank lending: if an entrepreneur does not wish to take extra lending after borrowing x from a single bank, he will not wish to do so either after borrowing x=N from N banks at the same rate. creditor right protection, i.e. a lower , for a competitive equilibrium to exist. The magnitude of region A is inversely related to the excess value generated by the small project, v: the greater this di¤erence, the weaker the temptation to switch to the large project.
[Insert Figure 2 ] 
Overborrowing
Are there conditions on the volatility of collateral and creditor rights protection under which overborrowing necessarily emerges, i.e. both both inequalities (6) and (7) simultaneously hold?
First, for condition (6) to hold, it must be the case that the entrepreneur undertaking the large project defaults on both banks in the bad state. To see this, consider that if the senior bank were to recover its money in this state, it would a fortiori recover it also in the good state; since the large project is not viable, the junior bank would then make losses. Being unable to recover its money in the bad state, the junior bank must recover it entirely in the good one, where it cannot exceed the entrepreneur's pledgeable income net of the senior bank's repayment, i.e. (1 )y L + 1 + r 1 . This repayment is smallest when the senior bank demands the highest possible repayment r 1 = y S on its loan: if even in this case the junior bank breaks even, it will always be ready to fund the entrepreneur's opportunistic borrowing. Using expression (4) with n = L, condition (6) then becomes
This inequality, which identi…es a necessary condition for opportunistic lending to occur, provides an upper bound ( ) on the parameter . When the fraction of private bene…ts does not exceed this bound, the junior bank can make pro…ts by demanding a repayment r 2 2x (in the region de…ned by (10), the junior bank just breaks even if r 2 = 2x).
It remains to be seen in which subset of this region the entrepreneur is willing to take an additional loan from the junior bank, so that also condition (7) holds. Setting the junior banks's repayment at its break-even level r 2 = 2x and using expressions (2) and (1), condition (7) becomes
In words, the entrepreneur wishes to undertake the large project if the implied private bene…t ( y L ) plus his wealth in the good state ((1 ) y L + 1 + r 1 2x) exceed the surplus y S r 1 generated by the small project plus the expected wealth E( e w) = 1.
This condition for opportunistic borrowing is hardest to meet when the entrepreneur's utility from the small project is largest, that is, when the rate r 1 charged by the senior bank is at its lowest, x. Hence, imposing r 1 = x in condition (11) yields the necessary condition for the entrepreneur to undertake the large project when the junior bank is willing to fund it. This translates into a lower bound ( ) on , i.e. requires the large project to yield large enough private bene…ts.
The following proposition summarizes this discussion:
Proposition 2 In the parameter region where
overborrowing necessarily occurs. This region is not empty for v + (y S + x)=2 < 1:
The parameter region characterized by the above proposition is shown as region C in Figure   7 . 11 In region C moral hazard is most severe: the fraction of surplus that borrowers can steal is so large and collateral value so volatile that opportunistic lending by the junior bank may never be deterred. Interestingly, the ine¢ ciency does not stem only from the entrepreneur's ability to extract private bene…ts , but also requires a su¢ ciently high volatility of collateral value: if the entrepreneur chooses the large project and the value of collateral is su¢ ciently volatile, in the good state the junior bank is able to recover the losses made in the bad state by charging a high interest rate, and this strengthens its incentive to lend. This ine¢ ciency region vanishes when v and y S are both very large: if the small project is very pro…table (y S large) or much more pro…table than the large one ( v large), the entrepreneur is not tempted to switch to the large project, so that moral hazard is no longer an issue.
Equilibria without information sharing
In the previous section we derived the boundaries of the competitive and e¢ cient region A, and of the overborrowing region C. As apparent from Figure 2 , these boundaries also de…ne an intermediate region B: here entrepreneurs would like to overborrow, i.e. condition (7) holds; yet, no junior bank would gain from providing extra funding to entrepreneurs who already borrowed
x, i.e. condition (6) is violated provided the senior bank requires a su¢ ciently onerous repayment from the entrepreneur, so as to make lending to him unappealing to its competitors. If instead a bank were to charge the competitive repayment x, it would not be able to deter additional lending by its competitors, i.e. condition (9) is violated. This also implies that in region B banks will refrain from undercutting each other down to the competitive repayment x, for fear of triggering opportunistic behavior.
This argument indicates that any equilibrium in this region must feature non-competitive repayments. Speci…cally, in this region there are two types of equilibria:
Proposition 3 In region B:
(i) for every pair ( ; ) there is a non-competitive equilibrium, where only one bank (say bank 1) funds the e¢ cient project with certainty by o¤ ering the contract c = (x; r ), with r 2 (x; y S ], and there is a subregion where the only equilibrium is non-competitive;
(ii) for su¢ ciently large, there are also zero-pro…t equilibria with rationing, where more than one bank is active and each o¤ ers a loan contract at the monopoly rate r M = y S with a probability less than one.
The …rst type of equilibrium described in this proposition is one where a single bank posts loan o¤ers and charges a non-competitive rate, possibly as high as the monopoly rate r M = y S .
This single lender is immune from other banks'undercutting, as in Parlour and Rajan (2001) .
In our setting, this is because an undercutter is itself exposed to the danger of opportunistic behavior by the borrower, who could accept his o¤er either together with that of the incumbent or with that of another bank. Indeed, the contract c o¤ered in this equilibrium features the largest rate among the contracts that are immune to opportunistic lending by junior banks and that cannot be pro…tably undercut by another contract itself immune to opportunistic lending.
For some parameter values, this is the only equilibrium contract, because by lending at the competitive rate the senior bank would either expose itself to the risk of opportunistic lending by a junior lender, or forgo non-competitive pro…ts. The latter occurs when junior banks are themselves unable to undercut the senior one, for fear that the entrepreneur might take both loans and go for the large project.
The second type of equilibrium is novel, and has the realistic feature that several banks post loan o¤ers and lend with positive probability. However, since the number of active banks is …nite, the entrepreneur may fail to obtain any loan. In this rationing equilibrium, the entrepreneur applies to all active banks, hoping to obtain loans from at least two of them, and banks accept his applications randomly, so that in equilibrium he may receive no, one or two loans. An active bank earns r M x if the entrepreneur is granted a single loan, and loses money if he turns out to get two loans and default in the bad state. Therefore, each bank's expected pro…t is decreasing in the number of loans o¤ered by competitors. The fraction of accepted loan applications is such that each bank just breaks even. 12
The idea behind all these rationing equilibria is that no bank can pro…tably deviate from its loan policy by raising the probability with which it accepts loan applications, in spite of the presence of rationing: the frequency with which competitors accept applications in equilibrium is such that no bank can gain by changing its lending probability. A su¢ cient condition for the existence of these rationing equilibria is that the private bene…ts from the large project are so high that the senior lender cannot protect himself from opportunistic borrowing, even when he charges the monopoly rate: when the entrepreneur happens to get two loans, he in ‡icts losses on both lenders.
Indeed credit rationing becomes the only possible equilibrium outcome in region C, where moral hazard is most severe, both and being highest: the fraction of surplus that borrowers can steal is so large and collateral value is so volatile that opportunistic lending may not be deterred, even by charging the monopoly rate. We show that in region C there are equilibria with stochastic rationing (where the entrepreneur does not receive credit with certainty) as well as an equilibrium with market freeze, where no bank posts o¤ers. However, in this region the repayment structure of these rationing equilibria di¤ers from that of region B: now, at least two di¤erent contracts must be o¤ered, one charging a "usurious repayment"r U above the monopoly level, and the other requiring the monopoly repayment. The repayment r U is the maximum that an entrepreneur who already borrowed at the monopolistic rate can pledge without defaulting in the good state. As shown in the Appendix,
Summarizing:
Proposition 4 In region C, there are both zero-pro…t equilibria with rationing and an equilibrium with market freeze. In the rationing equilibrium, each bank accepts the loan application with probability less than one. At least one bank o¤ ers the monopoly contract c M = x; r M , while the others o¤ er the usurious contract c U = (x; r U ).
In the rationing equilibrium, the entrepreneur applies for both the monopoly and the usurious loans: he may get (i) no loan, (ii) a loan at the monopoly rate, (iii) both the monopoly and the usurious contract, or (iv) two loans at the usurious rate. A bank issuing a monopoly loan earns pro…ts if the entrepreneur happens to take no other loan, and makes losses if he happens to take another loan. A bank lending at usurious rates makes pro…ts if the entrepreneur signed the monopoly contract with a competitor, and losses if he did so with another usurious lender.
The reason why there must be some banks o¤ering loans at usurious rates is as follows.
First, in this region the value of collateral is so volatile that even the monopolistic contract does not protect the bank against opportunistic lending. Second, creditor protection is so poor that a junior bank lending to an entrepreneur who already took a loan at the monopoly rate must charge more that the monopoly rate. Third, the entrepreneur is willing to borrow at such a high rate because the usurious loan allows him to appropriate part of the large project's return, while by defaulting he avoids paying this high rate in the bad state.
The probabilities with which contracts are o¤ered in equilibrium are such that all banks make zero pro…ts. Usurers are more likely to accept a loan application from the entrepreneur than non-usurers and therefore are more likely to face default by the entrepreneur (as they more frequently co-lend with other usurers), but charge correspondingly higher rates, in order to break even. This credit market segmentation is often observed in reality.
Empirical predictions
The model of multiple bank lending developed so far has two main empirical predictions: a novel one regarding the e¤ect of the volatility of collateral value, and another concerning creditor rights protection which is broadly in line with the literature.
The novel testable prediction is that multi-bank lending entails credit rationing only if the value of collateral is su¢ ciently volatile: as increases in Figure 2 , we move from competitive equilibrium to an equilibrium with rationing and high interest and default rates. This e¤ect does not arise in single-bank models of credit rationing, such as Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) , Williamson (1987) and Longhofer (1997) , where increases in the volatility of collateral are neutral. The prediction is that rationing should be more widespread in countries where real estate prices are more volatile and in industries with more unstable secondary market prices for collateral. By the same token, credit rationing should be more pervasive when the instability of house prices is more pronounced, as in the recent subprime loan crisis. This squares with our model's prediction that the volatility of collateral value is at the basis of the externality arising from non-exclusive lending.
The model also predicts that improving creditor protection -lowering in Figure 2 -tends to reduce credit rationing and raise competition. If borrowers'wealth is not very volatile (low ), strengthening creditor rights shifts the economy from region B to region A, thereby improving credit access and lowering default rates. If instead in region B the market features a noncompetitive equilibrium, a shift to region A implies more intense banking competition and lower interest rates. If borrowers'wealth is very volatile (high ), better creditor protection may shift the economy from region C to B, that is, from rationing to a non-competitive equilibrium where entrepreneurs are not rationed. In summary, the model predicts that creditor-friendly reforms increase credit availability, as in the above-mentioned models of credit rationing, and reduce default and interest rates by fostering banking competition.
These predictions are consistent with cross-country data and with U.S. data on interstate di¤erences in bankruptcy law. La Porta et al. (1997) and Djankov et al. (2007) show that countries with better creditor rights protection tend to feature broader credit markets. Along the same lines, Gropp, Scholz and White (1997) …nd that households living in states with comparatively high exemptions are more likely to be turned down for credit, borrow less and pay higher interest rates; and White (2006) shows that debt forgiveness in bankruptcy harms future borrowers by reducing credit availability and raising interest rates. Figure 7 shows that both of the two parameters discussed so far vary considerably across countries. The …gure plots on the horizontal axis the standard deviation of real house price changes between 1970 and 2006, as a proxy of collateral volatility , and on the vertical axis an inverse measure of creditor rights protection, as a proxy of the fraction of revenues that cannot be pledged to creditors. 13 [Insert Figure 3] 5 Equilibria with information sharing
We now turn to the regime where banks share information on entrepreneurs'borrowing histories, and in particular on their total exposure. As documented in Degryse et al. (2011) , this form of information sharing, which is widespread in credit markets, helps banks to guard against the risk of default, by conditioning loan o¤ers on the applicants' …nancial exposure. Information sharing has both "bright" and "dark" sides.
[Insert Figure 4 ]
First, it has pro-competitive e¤ects: it expands the parameter region where perfect competition is the unique equilibrium and, even where imperfect competition persists, it lower the equilibrium interest rate.
Relative to Figure 7 , the boundaries between regions move from the dashed to the solid lines shown in Figure 7 : the region where perfect competition is the only equilibrium expands 1 3 The choice of countries is dictated by the availability of comparable data for real house prices. The Bank of International Settlements provides such data for the 18 countries in the …gure. Creditor rights protection is drawn from Djankov et al. (2007) . Since the latter ranges between 0 and 4, the inverse measure plotted in the …gure equals 4 minus the Djankov et al. indicator. from A in Figure 7 to A 0 in Figure 7 . This expansion comes at the expense of region B, which shrinks to B 0 in Figure 7 . 14 In area A 0 non-competitive equilibria disappear, because information sharing allows outside lenders to safely undercut incumbents: starting from a non-competitive equilibrium candidate, any bank can now o¤er a better rate to the entrepreneur if he is not yet indebted (since it can verify his outstanding debts). Moreover, a competitive equilibrium will always exist in the area between the dashed and the solid lines: if the borrower seeks to switch to the large project he can no longer obtain an additional loan at the competitive rate, because if a bank discovers that the borrower is already indebted, it can either refuse lending to him, or equivalently require from him a break-even rate, which in this region deters him from opportunistic borrowing. As they no longer fear entrepreneurs playing them one against another, banks are now willing to o¤er loans of size x at the competitive rate in equilibrium.
But even in region B 0 where the competitive contract is not an equilibrium (since such a contract would expose the senior bank to the danger of opportunistic lending 15 ), the noncompetitive equilibrium repayment will be lower than the one that would prevail without information sharing. More precisely, the unique equilibrium contract is the one that features the lowest repayment among those that are immune to opportunistic lending by junior banks and that cannot be pro…tably undercut by a contract itself immune to opportunistic lending.
The second "bright"side of information sharing is to eliminate rationing equilibria where the entrepreneur is funded with some probability, in regions B and C. With information sharing, the uncertainty about how many contracts entrepreneurs have already signed vanishes. This eliminates the scope for rationing. To see why, recall that absent information sharing, in region B the entrepreneur could take two loans at a rate above the competitive level and default. With information sharing, instead, banks can check whether the entrepreneur has not yet received credit and give him credit only in this case. In doing so, they can be con…dent that no competing bank will grant a second loan, anticipating that doing so would induce default and in ‡ict losses on the junior lender.
1 4 In the Appendix we show that in the special case where v 1 x, this imperfectly competitive region disappears altogether. Hence, region B 0 is not empty for v < 1 x.
1 5 In the Appendix we show that in area B 0 conditions (6) and (7) hold for c1 = (x; x) -i.e., the junior bank can pro…t from lending opportunistically and the entrepreneur seeks for undertaking the large project when the senior bank o¤ers the competitive contract.
These e¤ects highlight the ability of information sharing to mitigate the contractual externalities that arise from the banks inability to enforce exclusivity in lending. To summarize:
Proposition 5 Under information sharing, the region with a unique, e¢ cient and competitive equilibrium expands, and the region with non-competitive equilibrium shrinks correspondingly.
In the latter region, the repayment is lower than the equilibrium repayment that would obtain without information sharing for the same ( ; ).
However, there is also a "dark side" to information sharing: now market freeze is the only equilibrium left in region C. Recall that in this region, upon obtaining a loan, the entrepreneur would be willing to take additional loans at the expenses of non-usurious lenders, and usurers are willing to o¤er him credit, since they expect to recover their money at the expense of nonusurious lenders. In the absence of information sharing, even usurers must worry about the risk of lending to a customer already indebted with another usurer: since the large project is not viable, in this region two usurers dealing with the same client lose money. In equilibrium, this limits lending at usurious rates. With information sharing, instead, usurers can easily discover if a credit applicant is not indebted with other usurers, because his pledged repayment will be lower than it would if he had taken an usurious loan. In so doing, usurers make lending unpro…table for any bank charging lower rates, and thereby cause the loan market to freeze :
Proposition 6 In region C there is a unique equilibrium with market freeze.
It may seem paradoxical that in region C information sharing reduces e¢ ciency even though it mitigates contractual externalities. The point, however, is that in this region contractual externalities between usurers were bene…cial in the absence of information sharing: banks lending at usurious rates had to worry about customers playing them one against the other, which kept them from competing too aggressively against non-usurious lenders. Information sharing dispenses them from this concern, but their more aggressive lending strategy kills o¤ the market.
Empirical predictions: e¤ects of information sharing
Our results o¤er a number of testable predictions on how information sharing about past indebtedness should a¤ect credit market performance. First, information sharing unambiguously reduces default and interest rates in active markets, and more so in countries with worse creditor protection and riskier collateral or, within a given country, for informationally opaque and riskier borrowers. Second, eliminating rationing should result in smaller individual loans. Third, when lenders spontaneously share information about past debts, credit availability invariably increases. If instead banks are forced to share information, credit supply will increase if the variability of collateral is not too large, because it will shift the economy from a an equilibrium with rationing to a situation with no rationing. However, if poor creditor protection is coupled with high uncertainty on the value of borrowers'collateral, mandatory information sharing reduces credit availability, by leading to a market freeze. This "dark side"of credit reporting may be relevant in some developing countries, where potential borrowers are farmers with very risky wealth, while lenders often charge usurious rates. In such environments, information sharing would enhance the usurers' ability to target clients, and so disrupt the viability of lending at non-usurious rates.
An expanding empirical literature, based on cross-country aggregate data (Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer, 2007 , Jappelli and Pagano, 2002 , Pagano and Jappelli, 1993 and on …rm-level data (Brown, Jappelli and Pagano, 2009; Galindo and Miller, 2001) , has showed that information sharing is associated with more lending and/or lower delinquencies. In particular, Doblas-Madrid and Minetti (2010), who explore contract-level data from a major U.S. credit bureau, …nd that as lenders enter the bureau, they experience a decline in borrowers' delinquencies, and more so for informationally opaque and riskier clients. Moreover, access to the bureau induces creditors to grant smaller individual loans, in line with our model's prediction. Chen and Degryse (2009), who analyze household lending by a major Chinese bank, …nd that the bank grants a larger credit line to borrowers for whom it receives extra information from other …nancial institutions, and that its lending decisions are a¤ected by data about lending by other banks, as assumed in our model, rather than about past delinquencies. A randomized experiment on a Guatemalan micro…nance lender who gradually started using a credit bureau, conducted by de Janvry, McIntosh and Sadoulet (2009), leads to broadly similar results: recourse to the credit bureau allows increased volume and e¢ ciency of lending, with no increase in defaults.
In terms of our analysis the expansion of lending associated with information sharing may be interpreted as an indication that in most instances information sharing reduces incentives for opportunistic lending, just as the improvement in legal protection of creditors discussed in Section 4.1. This "substitutability" relationship between information sharing and creditor protection is consistent with the evidence of Djankov et al. (2007) and Brown et al. (2009) .
Indeed, turning back to Figure 3 , it is precisely in some of the countries with weaker creditor protection (France) or higher collateral volatility (Italy and Spain) that public credit registers provide to banks the amount (as well as the maturity) of all the loans granted to each borrower. 16 Finally, the "dark side"of information sharing identi…ed by our analysis may help to interpret the evidence in Herzberg, Liberti and Paravisini (2008) , that the extension of Argentina's public credit register to loans below the $200,000 threshold in 1998 resulted in lower lending and higher default rates, for …rms that borrowed from multiple lenders. This evidence accords with the e¤ect of the introduction of information sharing in our rationing equilibrium when the uncertainty about collateral value is very high and creditor rights poorly protected. Both of these prerequisites apply in the case at hand: Argentina scores quite low on creditor protection according to the Djankov et al. (2007) indicator, and the 1998 extension in the credit register took place soon before Argentina plunged in the worst crisis of its postwar history.
Extensions
In this section we discuss two extensions of the model considered so far: the case where banks may voluntarily share information about their clients' indebtedness, and a regime where the information sharing system allows them to constantly monitor their clients'exposure even after the loan contract has been signed. The …rst extension is aimed at investigating whether in our setting the private and the social incentives to hare information are aligned; the second makes the simple point that in the extreme, information sharing can achieve the same outcome as exclusive lending.
Spontaneous information sharing
In several countries, publicly managed credit registries consolidate information on borrowers' credit worthiness, which typically include their total indebtedness. But there are also many countries where private information sharing systems (credit bureaus) have been developed by …nancial intermediaries on a voluntary basis, as a response to information asymmetries (Miller, 2003) . This naturally raises the issue of why banks may want to share information on entrepreneurs'indebtedness, and whether their incentives to do so are aligned with social e¢ ciency.
Our multiple-bank lending setup can be used to make a step toward in addressing this issue.
To this purpose, we consider an "expanded" version of the game considered so far, which also includes an initial stage ( = 1) where each bank announces whether it wishes to share information about its borrowers'promised repayment. For brevity, we focus on the case where these announcements are simultaneous and binding, and keep the analysis at an informal level.
As in the rest of the paper, the information-sharing arrangement is assumed to be costless: this rules out the possibility that banks may fail to set up a mutually advantageous credit reporting system only because they cannot agree on how to share its costs. We also neglect trivial equilibria where each bank does not share information only because it believes that its competitors will also refrain from doing so. Abstracting from such well-known coordination failures allows us to investigate whether there may be other sources of ine¢ ciency in the decision to create an information sharing arrangement, which are inherently related to the externalities between lenders and borrowers analyzed so far.
Finally, banks are assumed to opt for information sharing only if there is at least an equilibrium of the game in which this choice is strictly pro…table for them. This re…nement is meant to capture the idea that banks do not share worthless information just because it is free. In what follows, the equilibrium outcomes of our expanded game are analyzed separately for the three areas of Figure 2 .
Regions A and C are the easiest to analyze. Since in region A opportunistic behavior by borrowers and lenders can be deterred at no cost, banks cannot gain from sharing information.
Hence, information is not shared. The same conclusion holds in region C, but for a di¤erent reason: here information sharing would increase the scope for opportunistic lending. More speci…cally, in this region a bank that discloses information about its clients'indebtedness cannot obtain a positive pro…t, whichever repayment it requires. This is for the same reasons by which in this region information sharing (if exogenously imposed) leads to market freeze by Proposition 6. First, a banks that reveals to competitors that it has required a repayment below (or equal to) the monopoly rate simply attracts opportunistic lending by them, and thus incurs losses. But even banks o¤ering rates above the monopoly level do not bene…t from revealing it, because this would simply deter other banks from o¤ering rates below the monopoly level, hence preventing pro…table lending.
Things become more interesting, but also more complex, in region B. Here, disclosure of a client's indebtnedness could increase the lender's pro…ts, since it prevents opportunistic borrowing and thus reduces the borrower's default probability. Are these potential bene…ts su¢ cient to align private and social incentives for information sharing? The answer to this question is negative in general: in region B there are both e¢ cient equilibria where banks choose to share information and ine¢ cient equilibria where they do not, even though they could do so.
More speci…cally, whether voluntary information sharing emerges in region B depends on how the entrepreneur chooses his contractual partner when several banks o¤er the same rate and therefore is indi¤erent between them. The intuition for this multiplicity of equilibria is best seen by considering two speci…c cases: (i) that where the entrepreneur is "loyal" to a speci…c bank (possibly because of switching costs), namely, always chooses to borrow from it unless some other bank o¤ers a cheaper loan, and (ii) the case where the entrepreneur is "unloyal" and has a weak preference for banks sharing information, i.e. chooses randomly among the N best-priced o¤ers made by banks sharing information, provided these o¤ers are not worse than those of banks that do not disclose information.
Loyal entrepreneurs Banks choose not to share information if the entrepreneur is "loyal".
In this case, the credit market features either of the two equilibria outcomes presented in Section 4, i.e. the non-competitive equilibrium with a single active bank and the rationing equilibrium.
In both types of equilibria, active banks charge the maximal rate r that is not vulnerable either to opportunistic lending or to undercutting.
To see why no bank has the incentive to share information in each of these two equilibria, consider …rst the equilibrium where only bank 1 is active and the entrepreneur is loyal to this bank. This bank will not want to share information, because it correctly anticipates that upon disclosing it, its contract (x; r ) becomes prone to safe undercutting by any competitor. Moreover, no other bank wishes to share information, if bank 1 chooses not to do so: each anticipates that sharing information with banks other than bank 1 is useless, given that the entrepreneur is loyal to bank 1.
Consider next the equilibrium with rationing, which entails zero pro…ts for all banks. In this equilibrium, bank 1 may want to share information: the reason is that, if information is shared, the rationing equilibrium disappears and the only equilibrium outcome is one where the small project is funded at the lowest repayment rate that is robust to safe undercutting. If this rate exceeds the zero-pro…t one, bank 1 will be able to capture this pro…t because of the entrepreneur's loyalty. However, bank 1's competitors will not want to share information, as they anticipate that customer's loyalty will prevent them from getting any pro…t. Hence, also in this equilibrium information will not be shared.
Unloyal entrepreneurs Recall that in this case the entrepreneur chooses randomly among the …rst N o¤ers with the cheapest rate made by banks sharing information, unless some bank that does not share information o¤ers an even lower rate. If banks earn positive pro…ts by o¤ering the contract (x; r ) that charges the minimal rate not vulnerable to undercutting or to opportunistic lending, there are only equilibria where banks moving at stages = 1; 2; :::N , share information and lend x at the rate r , while other banks remain inactive. The intuition for this result is as follows. The weak preference displayed by the entrepreneur for banks sharing information ensures that each of the …rst N banks that chooses to share information and o¤ers the contract (x; r ) gets the pro…t associated to this contract with a probability 1=N : no bank is willing to lend at a rate below r , as it would be vulnerable to opportunistic lending or to undercutting. Hence the …rst N banks will earn positive expected pro…ts if they share information, and accordingly they will choose to share information. Indeed, in equilibrium no bank moving after stage t = N will want to share information: none of them can pro…tably deviate by sharing information at the initial stage and issuing the contract (x; r ), since the unloyal entrepreneur would never accepts this o¤er, given his assumed behavior.
In summary, if borrowers are "loyal", in area B banks will refrain from sharing information about their indebtedness even when it would be socially e¢ cient to do so; conversely, banks will e¢ ciently share information if entrepreneurs are "unloyal"and weakly prefer lenders who share information. The main policy implication is that competitive behavior does not necessarily lead banks to engage in socially bene…cial information sharing, which creates some scope for policy interventions aimed at mandating information sharing systems.
Full information sharing and loan covenants
So far, our analysis has proceeded under the simplifying assumption that, in the information sharing regime banks can only use retrospective information on their credit applicants'indebtedness. Alternatively, one could envisage a situation in which banks use a credit register to check exposures even after lending, and thefore condition their contracts to the subsequent borrowing undertaken by their clients. This regime, that we label "full information sharing", is equivalent to a situation where exclusive contracts are enforceable, provided banks can impose loan covenants that force early liquidation and repayment if total indebtedness exceeds a speci…ed threshold before the investment is made.
Hence, when banks can write and costlessly enforce loan covenants, full information sharing leads to a unique e¢ cient and competitive equilibrium for all parameter values, so that its bene…cial e¤ects are magni…ed. However, in reality covenants are costly to write and enforce; moreover, lenders may become aware of their violation after the investment stage. In these cases, full information sharing becomes e¤ectively equivalent to the regime where only retrospective information is shared, as assumed in Section 5.
Concluding remarks
When people can borrow from several banks, lending by each bank increases the customer's default risk. We show that the strength of this contractual externality depends on the variability of collateral value and on creditor rights protection. When creditor rights are well protected, the externality is absent or tenuous, so that banks can lend at competitive rates without fearing that their customers will take additional loans. When creditor protection is in an intermediate range, this externality generates equilibria with non-competitive rates and possibly credit rationing of some applicants. When the value of collateral is su¢ ciently volatile, the equilibrium always involves rationing and even usurious rates by some lenders.
For moderate levels of creditor protection and collateral volatility, information sharing mitigates these contractual externalities by allowing banks to condition their loans on the borrower's contractual history, so to guard themselves against opportunistic lending by competitors. As a result, it increases access to credit by eliminating rationing. However, in situations where collateral values very uncertain and creditor rights are poorly protected, information sharing exacerbates credit rationing and induces market freeze: this may be relevant for some developing countries or more generally at times of great turbulence, like …nancial crises.
Our model has three main testable predictions. First, credit rationing should be tighter, and interest and default rates larger when collateral is risky and creditor rights are poorly protected.
Second, information sharing about past debts should reduce default and interest rates. Third, information sharing should increase credit access when the value of collateral is relatively stable, but it reduces it when collateral is very risky. These three predictions are consistent with the empirical evidence.
Appendix: Proofs
Throughout the proofs, we characterize credit market equilibria where any active bank o¤ers only loans of size x. Consistent with the notation introduced in Section 2, the utility that an with e w 2 fw ; w + g, and
(1 ) y L + e w r 0 otherwise.
We denote by c P C = (x; x) and c M = (x; y S ) the contracts requiring the perfectly competitive and the monopolistic repayments, respectively. Moreover, we refer throughout to C (h ) as the set of contracts issued up to stage , while 2 [0; 1] is the fraction of applications for c that bank would accept, according to competitors' equilibrium beliefs, after issuing c . We will assume that all players have common beliefs.
Finally, to simplify the description of entrepreneurs' strategies, we assume without loss of generality that each entrepreneur applies for all contracts. Note that this is a weakly dominant strategy since entrepreneurs can opt out of a contract at any stage before .
The following lemma will be used to prove Proposition 1. The …rst part of the lemma states that the entrepreneur may bene…t from taking two loans only if he defaults in the bad state.
The second part identi…es the region in which the entrepreneur takes two loans with the same rate, if available, i.e. the region where individual incentive compatibility does not hold.
Lemma 1 The following properties hold: 
Proof. The proof of part (i) follows immediately from the fact that the NPV of the small project exceeds that of the large one. As for part (ii), straightforward calculations imply that This implies the result, since u(c; c) u(c; c ; ) is increasing in .
Proof of Proposition 1. We …rst prove existence and then uniqueness.
Existence. Consider the candidate equilibrium where (i) all banks issue the contract c P C and extend credit to all applicants for any possible C (h ); (ii) each entrepreneur takes a loan x by randomizing with equal probability among the banks o¤ering his most preferred contract, and undertakes the small e¢ cient project; (iii) at each stage , banks' beliefs are that their competitors accept all applications, i.e. = 1 for any possible c and C (h ).
Conditions (i)-(iii) identify a PBE. Indeed, entrepreneurs'strategies are sequentially rational given (ii) and (iii), since the individual incentive constraint (IIC thereafter) is satis…ed for ( ) by Lemma 1, so that u(c P C ; c ; ) u(c P C ; c P C ). Moreover, banks'strategies are sequentially rational (given the common beliefs on competitors'acceptance policies) since no bank can earn positive pro…t by o¤ering c 0 = (x 0 ; r 0 ) 6 = c P C . Indeed, the IIC condition guarantees that no entrepreneur will ever sign a contract c 0 = (x 0 ; r 0 ) such that r 0 > x under the beliefs (iii).
Uniqueness. We must show that for ( ) there exists no equilibrium where a contract c = (x; r), with r > x, is taken by any entrepreneur. The condition ( ), together with the continuity of the entrepreneurs'expected utility, implies that u(c 00 ; c ; ) > u(c 00 ; c), with r 00 su¢ ciently close to x, and r > r 00 . As a consequence, Assumption A6 guarantees that if c P C is not o¤ered, any bank can pro…tably deviate by o¤ering c 00 . Indeed, this contract makes positive pro…ts if accepted by any entrepreneur. Therefore, a necessary condition for contracts charging non-competitive rates to be signed in equilibrium by some entrepreneurs is that all banks earn positive pro…ts. But if so, then by assumption A6 some bank will undercut its competitors. hence, this cannot be an equilibrium.
Finally, region A is non-empty since ( ) > 0 at = 1, so that ( ) > 0 for all .
Proof of Proposition 2. Let us …rst introduce a de…nition and some new notation. Let us denote by JIC the set of contracts that satisfy joint incentive compatibility, and by K the subset of contracts in JIC that cannot be undercut by any other contract in JIC, that is: must be satis…ed by the contract with the lowest repayment in JIC. We shall denote by c = (x; r ) and c = (x; r ), where r > x, the contracts with the minimal and maximal repayment in K, respectively. Note that by de…nition c = c P C whenever c P C is jointly incentive compatible, which is true for 6 0 ( ).
We shall prove that in region B there is a PBE where only one bank is active, o¤ers c and accepts all applications for this contract. By using the same logic, one can show that, for any c 2 K, in region B there exists a PBE where only one bank o¤ers c and accepts all applications for this contract, while other banks are inactive.
Next, we prove the preliminary result that if bank 1 has issued contract c and bank 2 tries to undercut it by requiring a repayment below r , then there is always a bank 3 that can issue a contract c d such that both banks 2 and 3 make zero expected pro…ts. Let c = (x; r)
be the contract that earns zero pro…ts if an entrepreneur taking this contract and undertaking the large project defaults only in the bad state, i.e., (c; c) = 0 for c = (x; r), with r 2 ((1 ) y L + 1 r;
(1 ) y L + 1 + r] and r < r. Then:
Lemma 2 For any c = (x; r) with x r < r , and c d = (x; r d ) with r d > r, such that u(c P C ; c d ) = u(c P C ; c ; ), there is a couple (~ ; d ) 2 (0; 1) 2 that solves:
Proof. Equation ( Now let e c (h ) = (x;r (h )) be the contract with the lowest repayment in C (h ) and let b c (h ) denote the …rst contract with a repayment lower than r , which is issued before . We shall prove that the following strategies and beliefs describe a PBE:
Equilibrium strategies: if c = (x; r) 2 C (h ) ; with r 2 (r d ; r ), and c d = 2 C (h ), bank issues c d and accepts all applications.
(s4) In all histories that are not covered in (s1), (s2) and (s3), bank does not accept any application (whatever contract it o¤ers).
We shall also assume that if an entrepreneur decides to opt out of some, but not all, the contracts with the same repayment r, he will retain those signed at the earliest stage.
Equilibrium beliefs: Banks' beliefs at ( ) are common across banks and satisfy the following properties: In all other histories = 0.
(b4) For c = (x; r ) with r r and r 6 = r d ; r ; r , then = 0 for any possible h . Otherwise, = 0.
According to the above strategies only bank 1 is active, issues c and accepts all applications.
We shall now show that these strategies maximize bank 's expected pro…t in any continuation game, by considering in turn the cases where e r(h ) r and e r(h ) < r .
Case 1: r 0 r for all 0 < .
We prove that in this case it is optimal for bank to play according to (s1): issue c and accept all applications if and only if no previous bank has issued c .
Let start by assuming c 2 hC (h ). Bank does not obtain pro…ts from any policy (c ; ), with r > r and > 0. This is because (s1) implies c 00 = c and 00 = 1 for some 00 < , with r 6 = r . Thus, the policy ( = 1; c ), maximizes bank 's expected pro…t given its beliefs.
Finally, (b1) also implies that all banks remain inactive in the continuation game starting at stage + 1 after bank issued c . Hence, sequential rationality is satis…ed.
Case 2: r 0 < r for some 0 < .
We prove that in this case it is optimal for bank to play according to (s2), (s3) and (s4):
issue either c or c d depending on previous histories, or remain inactive.
Consider …rst the case in which r 00 > r for all 00 < , with 00 6 = 0 and c = 2 C (h ). In that c is bank 's optimal choice. Finally, sequential rationality is satis…ed as banks play a Nash equilibrium in any continuation game starting at b > : any bank moving after optimally choose to remain inactive if bank issued c, while it strictly prefers to issue c and accept all applications otherwise. This is true because c is the only contract that yields positive pro…ts to bank 0 > according to (b2) .
Consider now the case in which r 00 > r for all 00 < , with 00 6 = 0 ; c 2 C (h ) and bank 's equilibrium strategy prescribes to issue c d and to accept the fraction d of applications solving (A2) for c = c 00 = (x; r 00 ). Deviating from this strategy is not pro…table for the following reasons. First, requiring a repayment below r = r d would entail expected losses for bank by (A1). Second, if bank o¤ers r > r d , bank + 1 will choose (c = c d ; = 1) according to (b3). Then bank will make losses because it will attract only entrepreneurs who already signed jointly incentive compatible contracts. Moreover, equilibrium strategies satis…es sequential rationality. Indeed, in all histories where r 00 > r for all 00 < , with 00 6 = 0 ; c 2 C (h ), and a contract with a repayment larger than r d is issued, bank + 1 makes zero pro…t in expectation, according to (b5), by choosing (c d ; +1 2 [0; 1]) while it makes losses, according to (s3), if it issues any contract di¤erent from c d and accepts a positive fraction of applications. By the same logic, according to (s4), no bank can pro…tably o¤er loans, after any history in which r 0 < r for some 0 < , and c d and c are both issued.
Next, consider the case where several banks charge less than r before stage . Bank then believes that only the …rst mover, among those charging less than r , accepts applications. The same logic used above can be then used to prove sequential rationality at all .
Finally, for 1 > 3 v the necessary and su¢ cient condition for region B to be non-empty is
This inequality is equivalent to v < x, which is always true for y L > y S .
Proof of Proposition 3. We now show that, for any c 2 K, in region B there exists a symmetric PBE such that two banks are active, each issues contract c and rations the applications by choosing randomly among applicants. The proof is developed in two steps.
Step 1. We …rst consider c , the contract with the highest repayment in K. Suppose that there is a PBE with the following features: (i) only two banks are active, say and 0 , each o¤ers c = (x; r ) and accepts a fraction of its applications; (ii) entrepreneurs who borrow
x undertake the small project, those who manage to borrow 2x undertake the large one.
The expected per-client pro…t of each active bank is
The …rst term of ( ) is bank 's expected pro…t if bank 0 does not accept the entrepreneur's application, while the second is bank 's expected pro…t if bank 0 accepts this application.
Hence, a …rst step to prove the existence of a PBE satisfying (i)-(ii) is to show that ( ) = 0 has a solution 2 (0; 1). Since ( ) is continuous and monotone in , Step 2. We now show that there exists a zero-pro…t PBE with the features described in step 1.
Equilibrium strategies:
Formally, bank 's equilibrium strategy is de…ned by four properties (s1 0 )-(s4 0 ). Property (s1 0 ) is a modi…ed version of (s1) in the proof of Proposition 2:
(s1 0 ) If C (h ) = ?, or C (h ) 6 = ?,r(h ) r , c = 2 C (h ) and c = 2 C (h ), or only one bank, say 0 (with 0 < ) has issued a contract up to , and c 0 = c , then bank issues c and accepts applications with probability .
Properties (s2 0 ) and (s3 0 ) are identical to (s2) and (s3) stated in the proof of Proposition 2.
Instead, (s4 0 ) is stated below:
(s4 0 ) If two other banks already issued contract c before , or at least one bank issued c and another issued c d , or some bank issued c andr(h ) < r , then bank issues c ; .
Equilibrium beliefs:
Equilibrium beliefs satisfy …ve properties (b1 0 )-(b5 0 ). Properties (b3 0 ) and (b4 0 ) are the same as Note that e 2 (0; 1) because c d ; c < 0, since c and c d are both contained in K and r < r d < r . By the same token, also b 2 (0; 1).
Going through the same logical steps used to prove Proposition 2, the above strategies and beliefs can be shown to identify a PBE. These steps are omitted for brevity. These arguments can also be extended to show that for any c 2 K, there exists a rationing equilibrium where two banks are active and symmetrically o¤er c by choosing randomly among applicants.
Proof of Proposition 4. All rationing equilibria satisfy the following zero-pro…t condition:
where c = (x; r) with r 2 (r ; r ). Total di¤erentiation with respect to and r yields:
where the numerator is positive because a higher repayment (weakly) increases pro…ts in all states, and the denominator is negative because (c; c) < 0 and (c; c ; ) > 0 for r 2 K. Hence, d =dr > 0. To complete the proof, note that if applicants who obtain two loans default in both states, the default probability is = 2 = 2 (1 ) + 2 , while it is =2 if they default in the bad state only. Since d =d > 0, in both cases the default probability is increasing in .
Proof of Proposition 5. We start by showing that in the region under consideration there is a zero-pro…t PBE where one bank issues the monopoly contract c M and accepts a fraction M < 1 of applicants, two banks issue the usurious contract c U = (x; r U ) with r U > y S and accept a fraction of applicants U < 1, while the remaining banks stay inactive. In this equilibrium, each entrepreneur applies to all active banks and, when his applications are accepted by all active banks, he retains the contract c M and drops one of the two usurious contracts by randomizing with equal probability. For convention, we shall assume that bank 1 issues c M and bank 2 and 3 issue c U . The zero-pro…t conditions corresponding to this outcome are:
where the left-hand-side of (A5) is the expected pro…t of bank 1, earning (c M ; c ; ) > 0 on the fraction (1 U ) 2 of clients whose applications for c U are refused and (c M ; c U ) < 0 on the fraction (2(1 U ) U + U 2 ) of clients who obtain at least one acceptance for c U . Similarly, the right-hand side of (A6) is the expected pro…t of bank 2 and 3, which earn c U ; c M > 0 on the fraction M ( 1 U + ( U =2)) of clients who successfully apply for c M and c U ; c U < 0 on the fraction 1 M U of clients who sign at least another usurious contract. It is straightforward to verify that (A5) and (A6) have a unique solution ( M ; U ) 2 (0; 1) 2 . Finally, to prove the existence of an equilibrium with these features, denote by
the pro…t per loan that a bank earns if it o¤ers c = (x; r) with r 2 (y S ; r U ), provided that another bank issues c M and accepts the fraction M of applicants, two other banks issue c U and accept the fraction U of applicants, and the remaining banks stay inactive. In the following, we shall prove that there exists a PBE supported by the following strategies and beliefs.
Strategies: Entrepreneur e applies for all contracts; if only one bank, say bank , accepts his application, he uses this loan to fund investment if and only r y S , otherwise he drops this loan; if two or more of his applications are accepted, entrepreneur e retains only two of the loans with the lowest contractual repayments, by randomizing with equal probability between loans with identical repayment.
Banks'strategies have the following features:
(s1) If c M = 2 C (h ), bank issues c M and accepts the fraction M of applications; if c M 2 C (h ) and at most one bank has o¤ered c U before , bank issues c U and accepts the fraction U of applications.
(s2) If c M 2 C (h ), c U 2 C (h ) and has been issued by at least two banks, bank issues c 0 such that dev (c 0 ) = 0 and accepts all applications when some contract c such that dev (c) > 0 was already issued.
(s3) In all other histories, bank remains inactive.
Beliefs: Equilibrium beliefs are consistent with equilibrium strategies. Moreover, each bank believes that any deviating competitor refuses all applications.
Consider …rst a bank that deviates by issuing c = (x; r) with r 2 (r; r U ) at some stage .
According to equilibrium beliefs ( ) and competitors' equilibrium strategies, this bank earns the expected pro…t per loan (c; C(h t ); ) = (1 M ) (c; c 0 ). This deviation is unpro…table, i.e., (c; c 0 ) < 0, because: …rst, by construction r 0 > r (the break-even repayment conditional on no default in the good state); second, an entrepreneur signingĉ = (x;r) withr > r from two banks (and undertaking the large project) must default in both states, since otherwise both banks would make zero pro…ts, contradicting the assumption that the large project is unviable, implying (c 0 ; c 0 ) < 0; third, c will also induce default in both states, if taken jointly with c 0 , since r > r 0 , implying (c; c 0 ) < 0:
Moreover, no bank can pro…tably o¤er a rate r 2 (x; y S )[(r U ; 1). Indeed, given competitors' strategies and its own beliefs, any bank o¤ering c 0 = (x; r 0 ) with r 0 < y S earns an expected pro…t per loan (c 0 ; C (h ) ; ) equal to
One can easily verify that (c 0 ; C (h ) ; ) < 1 = 0. In addition, given competitors'strategies, a bank o¤ering c 00 = (x; r 00 ) with r 00 > r U , earns the expected pro…t per loan:
Again, it is easy to check that (c 00 ; C (h ) ; ) < 2 = 0. Thus, banks'and entrepreneurs' strategies de…ne a Nash equilibrium. Finally, it is straightforward to verify that no bank can pro…tably deviate by issuing a contract c = (x; r) with r 2 [y S ; r).
Moreover, banks'strategies are sequentially rational because, after any history, the continuation game starting at has a PBE where all banks use equilibrium strategies, given that banks moving after hold equilibrium beliefs.
To complete the proof, it remains to be shown that (i) there is no PBE satisfying A6 in which all funded entrepreneurs undertake the small project and (ii) there is a PBE where no entrepreneur is funded. Both these results are immediate. First, in any equilibrium candidate where all entrepreneurs undertake the small project, a deviating bank would earn a strictly positive pro…t by issuing c 0 = (x; r 0 ) with r 0 = r + " and " > 0, provided no other bank accepts applications. This implies that A6 cannot be satis…ed in any equilibrium where some entrepreneurs are funded and they all undertake the small project. Second, in the region under consideration there is an equilibrium with market freeze, supported by the following banks' strategies: for any , bank issues c and accepts all applications whenever c has not been issued before and remains inactive otherwise. Moreover, as in this region r > r M = y S because even the monopoly contract c M 6 2 JIC, no entrepreneur will sign c if only one bank o¤ers this contract and all other banks remain inactive. The details of these proofs are straightforward and therefore are omitted.
Finally, for 1 > 3 v the necessary and su¢ cient condition for region C to be non-empty is 0 ( ) < 1 at = 1, i.e.,
This inequality is equivalent to v < x 2 .
Remark: under information sharing banks may condition their acceptances to the entrepreneur's past credit history, i.e., his total indebtedness and its breakdown across loans. Taking this into account requires some additional notation: bank conditions the acceptance of a loan application to the pre-existing set of contractsĈ(h ), which applicants signed and did not opt out before stage . For instance,Ĉ(h ) = ? means that bank only accepts applications from entrepreneurs with zero debt. Moreover, let C e (h ) be the set of contracts that entrepreneur e actually signed up to stage 1, and from which he did not opt out before applying to bank .
Proof of Proposition 6. We shall …rst prove existence and then uniqueness.
Existence. We show that, with information sharing, in the region of parameters A 0 [ B 0 there exists a SPNE where only bank 1 is active and issues c , all entrepreneurs borrow from this bank and undertake the small project. Showing this is equivalent to proving that in region A 0 there is a competitive and e¢ cient equilibrium, since from the proof of Proposition 2 c = c P C for 0 ( ). Consider the following strategies:
(i) Banks'strategies:
(b1) bank 1 issues c and accepts all applications for this contract;
(b2) for any history h where all contracts issued at 0 < charged repayments r 0 r , bank issues c and accepts entrepreneur e's application if and only if C e (h 1 ) = ? or this entrepreneur opted out of all pre-existing contracts before applying for c ;
(b3) for any history h such that some bank has previously o¤ered a contract with repayment e r (h ) below r , bank issues c and accepts applications by entrepreneurs who signed at most one contract requiring a repayment below r .
(ii) Entrepreneurs'strategies: (e1) for any possible previous history, entrepreneurs apply for all contracts;
(e2) the entrepreneur e accepts a new contract c and retains a previously accepted contract c that bank does not require him to drop, if and only if the pair (c ;ĉ) makes him better o¤ than any other pair of contracts (c 0 ; c 00 ) that he already signed. Formally, he opts out of all the previously accepted contracts contained in C e (h 1 ) but not inĈ(h ) and applies for contract c if and only if u(ĉ; c ) > u(c 0 ; c 00 ), for someĉ 2Ĉ(h ) [ fc ; g and for all pairs (c 0 ; c 00 ) in C e (h 1 ) [ fc ; g, providedĈ(h ) C e (h 1 );
(e3) if instead the entrepreneur e has not previously signed any contractĉ required by bank , i.e.,Ĉ(h ) * C e (h 1 ), he retains all the previously accepted contracts.
Consider …rst bank 1's deviations. Bank 1 cannot increase its pro…ts by charging a repayment amount below r , since according to equilibrium strategies all entrepreneurs would accept such a new o¤er and never out of it. Bank 1 cannot increase its pro…ts by charging a higher repayment either, because such an o¤er would be successfully undercut: given (b2), bank 2 would issue c 2 = c and accept all applications of entrepreneurs with no debt at the application stage.
Next, after bank 1 issues c , no subsequent bank can pro…tably deviate. First, no other bank can gain by issuing a contract requiring a repayment larger than r , because by (b2) entrepreneurs will never …nd it pro…table to sign such a contract. Second, no bank > 1 can gain by issuing a contract c = (x; r ), with r < r : if it did so, according to (b 3 ) a third bank would o¤er the zero-pro…t contract c, the entrepreneur would be better o¤ by bundling c and c , and dropping c . As a result, bank would make losses, because the entrepreneur would undertake the unviable project and the bank that o¤ered c makes zero pro…ts (by de…nition of c).
For any history h where c 0 = (x; r 0 ), with r 0 r for all 0 < , bank 's strategy, which prescribes to o¤er c at , satis…es perfection since by (e3) an entrepreneur will only retain the …rst one of several identical contracts that he signed. Next, consider an history h such that e r (h ) < r ; where e c (h ) is the contract with the lowest repayment in C (h ). Then, the strategy of all banks moving after prescribes to o¤er c = c and accept applications from all entrepreneurs who have taken only one loan with repayment lower than r . These strategies,
given (e3), are part of a perfect equilibrium in the subgame starting at . By the same logic, subgame perfection holds for all .
Finally, consider possible deviations by entrepreneurs. Since banks'strategies condition acceptances only on the set of contracts that entrepreneurs accepted and did not drop, and not on their entire history of applications and acceptances, and since entrepreneurs can always opt out of previous loan contracts if optimal, they are always better o¤ accepting all the available loan o¤ers. Hence, (e1) and (e2) imply that entrepreneurs'strategies are sequentially rational at any , since, according to the equilibrium strategies, dropping a contract at never prevents an entrepreneur from accepting new pro…table deals after : given that banks follow their equilibrium strategies from on.
Uniqueness. We now show that the SPNE characterized in step 1 is unique in A 0 [ B 0 . First, there cannot be a SPNE where some entrepreneurs sign the contract c = (x; r ), with r < r at . This can be easily veri…ed in region A 0 where c = c P C . Consider instead region B 0 . In this region bank issuing c = (x; r ), with r < r , makes losses in any subgame after c is issued. This is because according to A6 some bank moving after will issue either c or c 0 = (x; r + ")
with " such that u (c 0 ; c ) > u (c ; c ; ), and accept applications by entrepreneurs with contract c.
Second, there cannot be a SPNE where some entrepreneurs sign c = (x; r), with r > r , at and undertake the small project: this is because contract c can be safely undercut by a cheaper and jointly incentive compatible contract. Finally, it is immediate that in region A 0 [ B 0 there cannot exist a SPNE where some entrepreneurs are excluded from credit: since c is jointly incentive compatible, the contract charging r < y S is pro…table and makes the entrepreneur better o¤ than with no borrowing.
Proof of Proposition 7. We …rst prove existence and then uniqueness.
Existence. We prove that there is a no-trade SPNE equilibrium where agents'strategies satisfy the following properties.
For any possible sequence of contracts issued up to , bank issues c and accepts the application of entrepreneur e if and only if this entrepreneur has signed only one contract with repayment lower or equal the monopoly repayment y S .
(ii) Entrepreneurs'strategies are the same as in the proof of Proposition 6.
We start by proving existence. Consider …rst banks' deviations. First, suppose that bank issues c = (x; r ) with r 2 (x; y S ) and accepts applications from entrepreneurs with zero total indebtedness at (for whomĈ(h ) = c ; ); this bank makes losses given competitors' strategies. This is because all entrepreneurs who sign c will also succeed in obtaining c from some other bank moving after , and in this region they will actually prefer to take both c and c and invest in the large and unviable project. Second, bank cannot pro…tably deviate by issuing any contract c = (x; r ) and accepting applications only from entrepreneurs who already signed one or more contracts. This is because, according to the banks'equilibrium strategy, no entrepreneur will be able to sign any contract before c is o¤ered. Thus, bank will end up making zero pro…ts. Moreover, banks'strategies are part of a perfect equilibrium: indeed, for any history such that no contract has been o¤ered up to , any contract c that entrepreneurs accept according to their equilibrium strategy generate losses for bank .
Consider next the entrepreneurs: proving that their strategies are sequentially rational at all stages follows the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 6.
Uniqueness. Suppose there is a SPNE in which a subset of entrepreneurs is funded. For all banks to at least break even, these entrepreneurs must get a loan of size x and undertake the small project. If so, entrepreneurs' rationality requires that they will accept a contract c = (x; r ) with r 2 [x; y S ]. But in this region any of such contracts violates joint incentive compatibility. In particular, u(c ; c) > u(c ; c ; ), and c will be issued by some other bank moving after according to A6, since it is jointly incentive compatible and hence entails no losses.
Therefore, contract c makes losses, and no bank will accept applications for it, i.e., c will not be o¤ered in equilibrium. 
